The Mesopotamian Dbq (Outline) Essay Example for Free

The Mesopotamian Dbq (Outline) Essay Group 1:Mesopotamia * Document 1: This document describes the story of an innocent god that shared water with animals at a watering hole. The document describes the importance of water by referencing to the herds of wild game and Enkidu. The people that have created this document have put much emphasis on water systems. * Document 2: This document covers the spectrum of the river systems and agricultural growth in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Indus regions using a map. * Document 3: In this document, a picture depicts reed huts in the marshes of Southern Iraq. It appears that in this area, a large, agricultural-based city does not thrive here. This document stresses that a successful river system is the base of cities. * Document 5: This document describes Marduk’s journey and his conversation that he held with the gods. Overall it is about the creation of Babylon. In the first paragraph, it mentions the location of where Babylon would be locates (near the Tigris and the Euphrates river). This displays the importance that the Babylonians placed on river systems. A: Marduk thought of the Earth as a mirror image of heaven, because he strengthened and prepared the grounds to create holy precinct that would be the home of the gods. Group 2: Egypt * Document 2: This document covers the spectrum of the river systems and agricultural growth in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Indus regions using a map. * Document 6: This document shows the Pyramids of Giza located nearby the Nile. The mud blocks used to create the Pyramids must have been created from a nearby river system. Group 3: Indus River Valley * Document 2: This document covers the spectrum of the river systems and agricultural growth in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Indus regions using a map. * Document 4: In this document the formation of mud brick fortification suggests that the Indus river valley Harappa, India indicate that they had an accessible river system nearby. * Document 7: In this document, the walls appear to be made from mud brick, which is a sign that they had utilized a nearby water system. Although the document above delivers evidence of the effect of rivers in these regions, it would be beneficial to have additional documents. A chart of population growth over time of all three regions would suffice. It would be able to display the comparisons and differences in the growth of population within each region. A excerpt of an Egyptian or Harappan script that described the role that their river systems played in their society.

14-3-3 Protein Analysis | Essay

14-3-3 Protein Analysis | Essay INTRODUCTION 14-3-3 represents a family of highly conserved, 28-33 kDa, acidic dimeric proteins. [B, H1] These proteins were first identified and isolated by Moore and Perez during their systematic study of protein fractions from mammalian brain tissue. [B1] Their nomenclature reflects the system used by the researchers to classify the various protein fractions, based on their migration pattern on starch gel electrophoresis and two-dimensional DEAE chromatography. [D1] Initially it was thought that the occurrence of these proteins was confined to neuronal tissue, where they were found to be present in concentrations as high as 13.3 ÃŽ ¼g/ml. [B19] However, subsequent studies showed that they are in fact widely distributed and ubiquitously expressed in most mammalian tissues. [B] Apart from mammalian tissue, orthologous proteins with a high degree of similarity have also been identified in other organisms including plants, yeast, insects and amphibians. [B] Interestingly, though no prokaryotic ancestor has been identified for the 14-3-3 gene, eukaryotes are known to express multiple isotypes, encoded by highly similar gene sequences. [A, G13] Drosophila and yeast each contain two 14-3-3 genes, Arabidopsis species have 15, while the human genome contains seven closely related 14-3-3 genes. [G13-G16] These genes encode the seven different 14-3-3 isotypes found in human cells – namely ÃŽ ², ÃŽ ³, ÏÆ', ÃŽ µ, ÃŽ ·, Ï„, and ÃŽ ¶. Two additional isoforms – ÃŽ ± and ÃŽ ´, represent the phosphorylated varieties of ÃŽ ² and ÃŽ ¶ respectively. [D7] By virtue of their conserved sequences, the different 14-3-3 isoforms display a similar tertiary structure. Crystallographic studies show that each subunit is made up of nine anti-parallel ÃŽ ± helices, which are able to self-assemble into dimers [F1]; with four of the nine helices participating in this process of dimerization. [A] While certain isoforms such as ÏÆ' and ÃŽ ³ show propensity towards the formation of homodimers, other isoforms like ÃŽ µ prefer to heterodimerize. [H] Structural analyses have also revealed that each monomer contains an amphipathic concave channel through which it interacts with its target proteins. [F13] Since each of the subunits of the dimer contain an independent ligand-binding groove, these proteins can interact with two different binding sites present on the same or different target proteins [H3] The targets of 14-3-3 proteins were first studied by Muslin et. al. in 1995, who determined that these proteins interact with phosphorylated serine-containing binding partners in a sequence specific manner. [A2] Thus, this came about to be the first family of proteins discovered to have an affinity for phosphoserine-specific targets. More specifically, Yaffe et. al. in 1997 identified two putative high-affinity motifs, bearing the sequences RSXpSXP and RXXXpSXP, where pS stands for phosphoserine, R stands for Arginine, P is proline and X is any amino acid. [] These were found to be the consensus sequences for 14-3-3 binding, and were called the mode I and mode II binding motifs respectively. [A21] However not all the 14-3-3 binding partners conform to these motifs and neither are all 14-3-3-target interactions found to be phosphorylation-dependent. [H] Though, a small percentage of 14-3-3 targets do not conform, in general it can be said that, proteins that interact with the 14-3-3 family are usually found to be globular proteins that contain either the mode I or mode II binding motifs within an unstructured region of the peptide. [PG] Interestingly, despite the fact that the different isotypes share a similar structure and show complete conservation of sequence in the ligand-binding region, not all the isotypes of 14-3-3 bind equivalently to their ligands in vivo and the pathways in which the individual isoforms participate have diverged considerably. This isoform specificity cannot be explained solely on the basis of 14-3-3 binding to the consensus sequence. [A, PA] It has hence been speculated that this isoform-specificity may be attributed either to differences in subcellular localization and/or tissue-specific transcriptional regulation rather than inherent differences in their ligand-binding ability. [D] Consequently, the various isoforms of the protein are found to bind different ligands and hence influence distinct cellular pathways and processes. Some of the ligands postulated on the basis of database searches include Raf1, CDC25C, polyoma middle T antigen, BAD, 5’AMP Kinase and PLC ÃŽ ³. [PA] Studies conducted in the late 1990’s demonstrated the ability of 14-3-3 proteins to interact with a number of different protein phosphatases and kinases in the cell, thus influencing multiple signalling pathways within the cell. [D] The mechanism of action of the 14-3-3 family of proteins is based on their ability to alter the stability, the catalytic activity or the subcellular localization of their targets. [H] 14-3-3 dimers being highly rigid, they are able to induce conformational changes in their target proteins as well as generate steric hindrance upon binding. Together, these forces can prevent molecular interactions by modulating the accessibility of the ligand to enzymes; and they can also serve to expose or hide localization motifs such as NES and NLS. [H] The first cellular activity to be attributed to 14-3-3 was that of an activator of tryptophan and tyrosine hydroxylases, rate-limiting enzymes that regulate the biosynthesis of catecholamine and serotonin neurotransmitter, as reported by Ichimura and co-workers. [B20] Subsequently it was discovered that 14-3-3 proteins could regulate the activity of signal transduction molecule protein kinase C. [D3,D4] This and other findings led to the implication that 14-3-3 proteins could act as novel chaperone proteins that are able to modulate the interactions between the different constituents of signal transduction pathways. [D5] Today it is known that 14-3-3 protein dimers are able to interact with a wide array of proteins within the cell including signalling molecules, apoptosis factors, tumor supressors, transcription factors, biosynthetic enzymes as well as cytoskeletal proteins; as a result of which they play crucial roles in the regulation of multiple cellular process such as the onset of cellular differentiation, and senescence, DNA repair and the maintenance of cell cycle check point, co-ordination of motility and adhesion and the prevention of apoptosis [A,H] REVIEW OF LITERATURE 14-3-3 proteins are crucial in the regulation of many cellular functions. An implication of their involvement in this multitude of processes is that any mutation, loss of regulation or altered expression of these proteins can lead them to be associated with major diseases. Through their involvement in the regulation of various tumor suppressor genes and oncogenes, 14-3-3 proteins are thought to be potentially involved in cancerous transformation and the development of malignancies. [Z11] They are also known to be associated with neurodegenerative conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease, ataxia and Parkinson’s disease. [MT1, MT2, MT3, MT4] The causes of these diseases are poorly understood and hence this family of proteins has been the focus of study of several research groups around the world, leading to numerous publications investigating all the different aspects. This section summarizes the literature elucidating the properties and functions of 14-3-3 proteins that have helped shape the rationale behind this project. A special focus is maintained on current literature that highlights role of 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ in the cell cycle and in desmosome assembly, as well as its recently discovered ATPase activity. Human 14-3-3 isoforms The members of the 14-3-3 family are among the most abundant proteins in the cell. It has been established that owing to their interaction with diverse targets, 14-3-3 proteins are known to be involved in a multitude of processes, including the control of gene transcription, metabolism, cell cycle regulation, and apoptosis. [C] However, not all 14-3-3 proteins carry out the same functions. The table below provides an overview of the properties of the various human 14-3-3 isoforms: 14-3-3 isoform Official symbol Official full name Chrom-osome location No. of amino acids Mol.Wt. (kDa) Interactions, functions and disorders 14-3-3 ÃŽ ² YWHAB Tyrosine 3-monooxygenase/tryptophan 5-monooxygenase activation protein, beta 20 q13.1 246 27.95 shown to interact with CDC25 phosphatases and RAF1 may play a role in relaying mitogenic signaling to the cell cycle machinery 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ YWHAG Tyrosine 3-monooxygenase/tryptophan 5-monooxygenase activation protein, gamma 7 q11.23 247 28.12 interacts with RAF1, CDC25C and protein kinase C induced by growth factors in human vascular smooth muscle cells also expressed significantly in heart and skeletal muscles 14-3-3 ÏÆ' YWHAS, SFN Stratifin 1 p36.11 248 27.64 known to interact with PLK4, ERRFI1, MARK3, JUB expressed in epithelial cells 14-3-3 ÃŽ µ YWHAE Tyrosine 3-monooxygenase/tryptophan 5-monooxygenase activation protein, epsilon 17 p13.3 255 29.03 interacts with RAF1, CDC25 phosphatases, and IRS1 proteins plays a role in pathways related to signal transduction, cell division and regulation of insulin sensitivity implicated in the pathogenesis of small-cell lung cancer 14-3-3 ÃŽ · YWHAH Tyrosine 3-monooxygenase/tryptophan 5-monooxygenase activation protein, eta 22 q12.3 246 28.09 contains a repeating sequence, 7 bp in length, in its 5 UTR changes in the number of repeats are associated with conditions such as psychotic bipolar disorder and schizophrenia 14-3-3 Ï„/ÃŽ ¸ YWHAQ Tyrosine 3-monooxygenase/tryptophan 5-monooxygenase activation protein, theta 2 p25.1 245 27.63 found to be over-expressed in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis also expressed in T cells 14-3-3 ÃŽ ¶ YWHAZ Tyrosine 3-monooxygenase/tryptophan 5-monooxygenase activation protein, zeta 8 q23.1 245 27.61 interacts with IRS1 protein may play a role in regulating insulin sensitivity 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ is an adapter protein that is known to be involved in the regulation of a wide range of signalling pathways, both general and specialized. This protein is encoded by a gene designated YWHAG, which was mapped to the chromosome 7q11.23 by Horie et. al. in 1999 [Z2] A study of its binding partners in a yeast two-hybrid study revealed that 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ may have as many as 130 potential ligands. [PG 4] There are reports which link the overexpression of 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ and its high titres in the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) with certain neurodegenerative disorders such as Down syndrome and Alzheimer’s. [A129, A131] This protein is also thought to to be involved in the process of carcinogenesis. Although 14-3-3 ÏÆ' is the isoform that has been most extensively studied for its association with human cancers, there are also several ongoing studies which attempt to establish a correlation between 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ expression and the development of tumours. This includes the work of Jieqiang Lv. et. al. which was able to demonstrate through proteomic analysis that a reduced expression of 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ is observed in patients with uterine tumours. [Z10] The role of 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ in cancer can be better appreciated by understanding its role in the cell cycle and its regulation. Role of 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ in the cell cycle 14-3-3 proteins play a major role in the regulation of cell cycle through the interaction with various cell cycle proteins. The main targets for 14-3-3 regulation are the Cdc25 proteins. Cdc25 is a family of protein phosphatases comprising the members Cdc25A, Cdc25B and Cdc25C, which are active during different phases of the cell cycle. Cdc25A participates in the regulation of G1/S transition, whereas Cdc25B and Cdc25C regulate G2/M transition. [z3] Cdc25c has been specifically implicated in the activation of the CDK1-cyclinB1 complex by removing inhibitory phosphorylations at T14 and Y15, which advances the cell cycle from G2 to M phase. The overexpression of this protein has been seen to result in mitotic catastrophe in the cell due to premature mitosis. [E28] Therefore the expression and function of Cdc25C needs to be tightly regulated; and 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ plays a crucial role in this regulation. [E29] During the interphase, 14-3-3 proteins bind to Cdc25C and sequester it in the cytoplasm by occluding the NLS, preventing it from accessing the CDK1-cyclinB1 complex in the nucleus and thus in essence inactivating it. [E28] Dalal et. al. showed that though all the 14-3-3 proteins were able to carry out this function in vitro, only 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ and ÃŽ µ were found to bind to and thus inhibit Cdc25C in vivo. [] This binding however was found to require the phosphorylation of a specific serine residue at position 216 in human cells, usually carried out by TAK1 and other similar kinases. [E30, z4] Cdc25C is also known to be a target of the DNA replication and DNA damage checkpoints that exert their effects through the phosphorylation of S216 by kinases like Chk1 and Chk2. [z5, z6, z7] This phosphorylation thus generates a high-affinity motif that is able to bind to 14-3-3 proteins present in the cytosol. A schematic representation of this process is provided in the figure below. In the absence of 14-3-3 proteins, this regulation of Cdc25C is disrupted and a result, cells lose their ability to stop cycling upon loss of integrity of their DNA. To this effect, a study conducted by Hosing et. al. in 2008 showed that cells require 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ in order to maintain their ability to arrest cells in the S phase and the G2 phase checkpoint. [] This was proven by generating 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ knockdown cells, and studying their response to DNA damage. It was found that these cells were unable to arrest in G2, thus leading to an increase in premature chromatin condensation (PCC) as compared to the vector control. [] This was the first report suggesting that 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ modulates the cell cycle checkpoint response, through its negative regulation of cdc25C function. Role of 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ in desmosome assembly 14-3-3 isoforms were also not known to have any role to play in the assembly of desmosomes, until a serendipitous observation led to a study conducted by Sehgal et. al. This study demonstrated for the first time that 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ is required for desmosome formation. [] They showed that 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ is able to form complexes with the desmosomal proteins plakoglobin, desmoplakin and plakophilin 3. Their work led to the conclusion that 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ is essential for the recruitment of plakoglobin to the cell border; and that the loss of 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ leads to a decrease in desmosome formation. This translates to defective cell-cell adhesion in HCT 116 cells and sterility in male mice when this loss is manifested in the testis. [] These results are in agreement with the fact that 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ plays a role in the transport of proteins from the Golgi complex to the cell border, as previously reported by Valente et al. in 2012. [Z1] ATPase activity of 14-3-3 proteins The notion that 14-3-3 proteins may possess an ATPase function evolved through a series of studies. The first of these was reported in a paper in 1993 by Hachiya et. al., who had isolated a protein from the rat liver cell cytosol, called the mitochondrial import stimulation factor (MSF). [] This factor was found to modulate the conformation of aggregated proteins and stimulate their import into the mitochondria in an ATP-dependent manner, much like the Hsp70 chaperone molecule. Ensuing studies by the same group led to the cloning of cDNA sequences encoding the large and small rat MSF subunits; and based on these cDNA sequences, it was deduced that the MSF peptides belong to the 14-3-3 family. [] This was thus the first time the ability to hydrolyse ATP was attributed to a 14-3-3 protein. In 1997, Yano et. al. probed further and asked whether the 14-3-3 family of proteins were also capable of the reverse reaction i.e. ATP synthesis; and found that native 14-3-3 proteins isolated from human lymphoblastoma cells as well as recombinant 14-3-3 Ï„ exhibited the ability to generate ATP from ADP. [] This activity resembled that of the enzyme nucleoside diphosphate-kinase. It was then speculated that ATP synthesis and hydrolysis may play a role in regulating the interaction of 14-3-3 proteins with their substrates. Subsequently, in 2006, Yano et. al. also showed that 14-3-3 ÃŽ ¶ acts as a molecular chaperone under heat shock conditions, dissolving thermally-aggregated proteins, also in an ATP-dependent manner. [] This stress-related function is said to differ from the role of MSF as previously described, since in that case, the protein activity is limited to the transport of newly synthesized proteins into the mitochondria. This finding thus represented another part of the puzzle that is the multi-functional nature of 14-3-3 proteins. Despite these reports however, the ATPase activity of 14-3-3 proteins had not commanded much attention from researchers, until recently Ramteke et. al. in 2014 demonstrated unequivocally, using 14-3-3 ÃŽ ¶ as a model, that these proteins possess an intrinsic ATP-hydrolysing function. [] They also studied the putative residues essential to this activity and found that in their model, the mutation of the Asp at residue 124 to Ala (D124A) resulted in a significant increase in the rate of ATP hydrolysis, while the mutation of Arg 55 to Ala caused a partial loss of function. ATPase activity of 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³ As a part of the same study, Ramteke et. al. decided to test whether the other 14-3-3 isoforms also displayed similar properties; and they found that with the exception of 14-3-3 ÏÆ', all the other isoforms, including 14-3-3 ÃŽ ³, showed intrinsic ATPase activity. [] Interestingly, it was found that in case of the ÃŽ ³ isoform, the mutation of the conserved Asp, found at position 129 to Ala (D129A) led to an over two-fold gain in ATPase function, reflecting that the binding of this mutant to ATP is probably either more energetically or sterically favourable. [] The authors of this paper were however unable to comment on the functional relevance of the ATPase activity of 14-3-3 proteins. These results however provide an impetus to further studies on physiological significance of ATP hydrolysis, with respect to individual 14-3-3 isoforms.

Oil Platforms Case Study

Oil Platforms Case Study The Oil Platforms Case The Rule of Force in International Law I. Introduction This paper relates to the Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States) of the International Court of Justice and its decision on the same delivered on November 6th, 2003. The dispute is related to a series of events that occurred during the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988. During the war, due to attacks on merchant shipping vessels in the Persian Gulf, the US and other states engaged in â€Å"counter-attack† by targeting two Iranian oil platforms and severely damaging them in separate incidents. The US argued that it was only responding to a perceived threat and the attacks were only in the interest of security in the region. Tehran, not buying this theory of self-defence put forth by the US, cited several violations of bi-lateral International treaties crying foul over such use force. The prohibition of the usage of force by states in engrafted in customary international law as well as in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. But both fall short of containing force that is used in the States exercise of the right of self-defence. The ICJ in this particular case had to assert whether the force used by the US was really pre-emptive in nature; if it was, was it proportionate. The court whilst delivering its judgment developed an interesting new theory on such use of force by a state, a theory which has only been received critically. This paper shall seek to explore this particular theory in light of the aforementioned case. It must also be noted that this being a recent judgment holds immense practical significance with regard to the US operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the troubled Baluchistan and NWFP provinces of Pakistan. To facilitate easy study, this paper has been divided into three parts; the first shall be an appraisal of the facts of the case itself, the second shall be a study of Article 2(4) and the final part will be a review judgment. II. The Facts of the Case and its Backdrop The case arose out of certain incidents during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988. The case before the international Court of Justice revolved around the legality of the use of force with relation to two specific attacks against Iranian interests by US forces during the course of the war. The first instance was on October 19th, 1987. The US navy launched armed attacks against Irans Reshadat and Resalat oil complexes, both located in the Persian Gulf. This resulted in the complete annihilation of one of the oil platforms, whereas the other was severely damaged. As justification, the US claimed it was acting in ‘self-defence and the attack was in response to a missile strike three days prior on the Sea Isle City, a Kuwaiti tanker rebadged as a US flag-carrier in order to better ensure its safety. The second attack occurred a year later on April 18th, 1988 when US naval strikes severely damaged the Iranian Nasr and Salman complexes, nearly destroying the former. This time the US resorted to its prior justification of â€Å"acting in self-defence† again by stating that the attacks were in response to an American frigate, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, having been struck by a mine whilst sailing in international waters near Bahrain. On both instances the US notified the United Nations Security Council of its course of action in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Iranian Government in its Application to the court based its claims on the 1955Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the US and Iran (the Treaty), not sparing basic principles of international law. The Courts (the International Court of Justice) jurisdiction was founded on Article XXI (2) of the Treaty. Article I of the Treaty provided that â€Å"there shall be firm and enduring peace and sincere friendship between the United States of America and Iran†. Article X(1) of the Treaty provided that there should be freedom of commerce and navigation between the parties territories: â€Å"Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation.† Based on Articles I and X(1) of the Treaty of Amity, Iran accused the United States of having breached the Treaty by attacking and destroying the oil platforms. It also submitted that United States â€Å"patently hostile and threatening attitude towards the Islamic Republic of Iran† was a breach of the very purpose and object of the Treaty of amity including Articles I and X(1), and principles of international law, and that the US was under an obligation to make reparations to Iran for the violation of such legal obligations. The US denied any breach of obligation with Iran under Article X(1) and replied that the attacks were necessary to protect its national security. This, according to the US, was covered by Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty and read: â€Å"The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures: (d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests.† Also, the US, in another counter-claim pleaded unsuccessfully, claimed that Iran had violated Article X of the Treaty by attacking its vessels and laying mines in the Persian Gulf and â€Å"engaging in activities from 1987 to 1988 that were dangerous and detrimental to maritime commerce and navigation†. The US claims of military attack on merchant vessels and warships were not completely unfounded. During the from 1984 to 1988, known as the Tanker War, numerous vessels were attacked in the Persian Gulf and such attacks were perceived to be purported by the Iranian military by means of aerial attacks and the use of mines. The Llyods Maritime Information Service list noted more 546 incidents, 200 of which were directly attributed to Iran. Iran, however, directed such accusations to Iraq and claimed responsibility for none. It must be noted here that the Treaty of Amity was signed between the US and Iran back in 1955. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran and the installation of the Khomeini as the head-of-state in all practical aspects, relations between the two states soured and was particularly before the start of the Iran-Iraq war. During the revolution, the US expressed its dissatisfaction with affairs in Iran by severing all diplomatic ties with the Islamic state. The American embassy at Tehran was seiged by supporters of the Khomeini and Americans were taken hostage for a considerable period of time. Irans previous democratically regime headed by the Shah had been seen by the US as an ally; this did not go down too well with its new Government which accused the US of â€Å"over-involvement† with its internal affairs during the past regime. Further, the new government of Iran saw the inability of the Security Council to prevent and contain Iraqs invasion of Iran in September, 1980 as the result of an anti-Iran bias in the Council and even in the UN as a whole. Under such circumstances, the Iranian regime saw the increasing presence of American forces in the Persian Gulf as a perceived threat to its interests resulting in the attacks. Ergo, this conflict was not completely unpredictable; nor was it unavoidable as it had been on the offing for a while. In this respect, the Security Council had failed to check the rising tension between the two states. As a body whose primary task is maintaining world peace and stability it had failed to contain such a conflict which could have been resolved had it played a more active role in mediation between the states. III. Article 2(4) The Blind-spot Article 2(4) of the UN Charter reads: This provision of the Charter however, finds itself lacking and is ill-equipped to handle a rather important aspect international armed conflict. Its blind-spot it has no provisions for prohibition of military threats or the threat of use of force. The ambit of article 2(4) is limited to actual use of military force and â€Å"threats† to impose economic or political sanctions are beyond it. According to the general scheme of the UN charter, a violation of Ar. 2(4) may be justified only on two grounds recourse to self defence and authorisation by the UNSC. This brings us to the moot question Are states free to reciprocate to threats when no armed attack has actually occurred? This question has been left unanswered and its outcome the many wars fought even after the UN Charter was adopted. Two perfect examples of such a situation arose in Europe in August, 1914, the beginning of the First World War and again during the Second World War. The question before a nation is whether to ignore the military threat or to issue a counter-threat. In such a situation when one party is advantaged by overwhelming military threat, the threat involved will become lopsided and there will not be any real escalation or build-up of bilateral tension. Any country will always place self-defence on a higher footing as compared to a policy of self-restraint considering the demands of national security. The prohibition on the use of force is found both in customary international law and, as stated above, in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. According to the UN Charter a state is not allowed to use force as a response to any intervention that falls short of an armed attack. The criterions established for the exercise of such retaliatory force include requirements that the force used must be necessary to repel the armed attack; it must be absolutely unavoidable and the force used must be proportionate. The Nicaragua decision [Case Concerning Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA)] echoed this principle. Article 51 carrying forward from Article 2(4) too recognizes states right to act in individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack is suffered by any member-state of the UN. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, force may also be used to preserve or restore international peace and security in accordance with decisions of the UN Security Council. In the Nicaragua case, the Court rejected US arguments that US support for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua could be justified on a basis of collective self-defence. These activities included certain activity of the contras in Nicaragua, including specified attacks, secret mine-laying, and a trade embargo imposed by the US against Nicaragua. The Court found the United States was in breach inter-alia of its obligations under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State, not to violate the sovereignty of another State, not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce and not to use force against another State. The US had also violated bilateral obligations to Nicaragua under a 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua. In the Nicaragua case the US chose not to appear before the Court during proceedings on the merits of the case. The Courts jurisdiction was founded on the United States 1946 declaration of acceptance of the Courts jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court, as well as on the bilateral 1956 Treaty. IV. The Judgement The approach taken by the International Court of Justice in the Oil Platforms case was controversial. In respect of Irans claim, the Court decided to address the question of whether the US attacks on Iranian oil platforms fell within Article XX(1)(d), before moving on to considerwhether there had been a breach of Article X(1) as requestedby Iran. In examining the application of Article XX(1)(d) the Courtdecided to focus on whether US recourse to force had been consistentwith international law on self-defence. The Court reasoned that evena provision protecting national security interests could not have beenintended to sanction the use of force inconsistently with relevant internationallaw. The Court proceeded to find that the US had exceededthe boundaries of international law on the use of force, and this disposedof the US claim that it was protected by Article XX(1)(d). In this way, the case centred on the illegality of the usage of force by the US. Recalling the discussion Article 2(4), the Court found that the US had failed to produce enough evidence to prove an Iranian â€Å"armed attack† in the case of the Sea Isle City and the Samuel B. Roberts. The evidence furnished by the US was so inconclusive that the Court did not discount the possibility of the attacks being carried out by Iraq. The Court noted that the Sea Isle City, at the time of the attack, was in Kuwaiti waters and the missile was launched on to it from a distance of over a hundred kilometres. The target of the missile, considering the great distance, could not have been pre-determined and it could have been intended to strike just about any target in Kuwaiti waters. With regard to the impugned mine-laying activities of Iran, the Court was again discontent with the evidence provided. There was no conclusive evidence to prove that the mine struck by the USS Samuel B. Roberts was indeed an Iranian one. The region at that time was in a state of turmoil. Both parties were engaged in mining the conflict zone and merely because the impugned mines bore numbers matching an Iranian series, Iran can not be held guilty. Whilst leaving room for speculation with the issue of the origin of the mines, the Court felt that even if they had actually been of Iranian origin, the US attacks on the Salman and Nasr complexes were unjustified. Recalling the Nicaragua decision, the Court opined that the Iranian attacks, if at all they were Iranian, did not qualify as â€Å"the ‘most grave form of the use of force† and the US can not claim the defence of â€Å"inherent right of self-defence†. The US contended that the oil platforms were being used as military bases by Iran and were being used for the collection and reporting of intelligence on passing vessels. In this regard too, the Court found the American evidence lacking. Even if the accusations against Iran had been true, the Court opined that the attacks made on the platforms could not have been justified as acts of self-defence. The criteria for claiming the defence of ‘self-defence had been established by the Court while acting in its advisory role in the case of Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons; they were â€Å"necessity† and â€Å"proportionality†. The US had failed to make out a sufficient cause on both grounds. The Court noted that the attacks on the platforms were not ‘necessary as a response to the attacks on the American vessels and the US admitted to have attacked them as a â€Å"target of opportunity† and not as pre-determined military targets. While the US attack on the Reshadat and Resalat complexes might have been considered proportionate if it had been found to be necessary, the Court made clear its view that the US attack on the Salman and Nasr platforms could not be regarded as meeting the criterion of proportionality. Although the Samuel B. Roberts had been severely damaged it had not been sunk and there had been no loss of life. The Court concluded that as the US attacks on the Iranian oil platform were not consistent with these requirements of international law on self-defence they could not be found to fall within the protection of Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty of Amity. Only at this point did the US get some reprieve when the Court turned to the Iranian accusation of the US having breached Article X(1) of the Treaty of Amity by interfering with the freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of the two parties. The Court found that Iran had failed to establish that the US had breached Article X(1) on the occasion of either of the attacks at issue. In respect of the first US attack, on the Reshadat and Resalat platforms, the Court reached this conclusion primarily on the basis that these platforms had been put out of commission by earlier Iraqi attacks and were not producing oil at the time. Therefore there was no interference with commerce in oil. In respect of the second US attack, on the Salman and Nasr platforms, the Courts reasoning was that the US had already stopped all direct oil imports from Iran under an embargo imposed by Executive Order. Therefore, no interference with commerce in oil had resulted from this second attack. T he Court emphasised that Article X(1) applied only to protect freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of the two parties, and its protection did not extend to indirect commerce in oil that continued despite the embargo via the territories of third parties. Accordingly, neither of the US attacks on the Iranian Oil Platforms was found to have interfered with freedom of commerce in oil. The US counterclaim against Iran likewise failed because none of the affected vessels was engaged in commerce or navigation between the territories of the two parties. Summing the case, in its dispositif at the end of its judgment, the Court stated that, by fourteen votes to two, it: Finds the actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America under Article XX, paragraph 1(d), of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, as interpreted in the light of international law on the use of force; finds further that the Court cannot however uphold the submission of the Islamic Republic of Iran that those actions constitute a breach of the obligations of the United States of America under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty, regarding freedom of commerce between the territories of the parties, and that, accordingly, the claim of the Islamic Republic of Iran for reparation also cannot be upheld. V. Comments The Oil Platforms case is of immense significance in present times in light of the growing military activities of the US in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, its detractors criticise the judgment by stating that it laid too little importance on the aspect of trade and commerce and the role it plays in armed conflict. This can not be ignored completely; after all, most battles are fought with a hidden economic interest for atleast one of the parties. The dissenting judges opined that the Court let pass an opportunity for more lengthy engagement with significant questions associated with the effects of armed conflict on trade and commercial activity. But, this cases primary focus was the use of force and in the opinion of the researcher it has done absolute justice in establishing its principle. The conditions of â€Å"necessity† and â€Å"proportionality† have not only been reinforced by the Court but also been developed to address the growing concerns of armed conflicts between states. As the future of Afghanistan and Iraq unfold before us and American interest in Irans affairs rises, the contribution of the judgment in the Oil Platforms case can not be ignored. It shall be the judge in assessing US activities in the region and will assist in developing the yard-stick of the usage of force. In a way future military activities of the US and other NATO allies will be moulded by it, ensuring a more secure world. Bibliography Harris D.J., Cases and Materials on International Law, Sweet Maxwell, London, 6th edition. Goodrich Leland, Hanbro Eward, Simmons Anne, Charter of the UN: Commentary Documents, Oxford University Press, 3rd edition. Sturchler Nikolas, The Threat of force in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. General List No 90, I.C.J. Reports 2003 Sturchler Nikolas, The Threat of force in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. See the Courts Order dated 12th December, 1996. Judgment of the Court, para 23. Counter-Memorial of the United States, Exhibit 9, referred to in the Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para 11. See the Courts Judgment of 24 May 1980 in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. Judgment of the Court, para 23ff; Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para 5ff. Goodrich Leland, Hanbro Eward, Simmons Anne, Charter of the UN: Commentary Documents, Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, p. 49. Supra n.2 Sturchler Nikolas, The Threat of force in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. General List no.70, Judgment of the Court of 27th June, 1986. Ibid. Judgment of the Court, para 61. Ibid., para 72. Ibid., para 64. Judgment of the Court, para. 71. Judgment of the Court, para. 64. Judgment of the Court, para. 74. ICJ Reports 1996 (I), p. 245, para.41. Judgment of the Court, para. 76. Judgment of the Court, para. 77. Judgment of the Court, para. 92ff. Judgment of the Court, para. 94ff. Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins para 51.

An Analysis of Frosts Tree at my Window Essay -- Tree at my Window E

An Analysis of   Frost's Tree at my Window      Ã‚   "Tree at my Window" was written by Robert Frost, an American poet who was born in 1874 and died in 1963 (DiYanni 624). His poem will be the basis of the discussion of this brief essay. The narrator in this poem appears to be speaking to the "tree at my window"; then, repeating the phrase in reverse order, he calls it the "window tree," as if to emphasize the location and nearness of the tree. Calling the tree a "window tree," might also suggest that this tree is something he sees through, perhaps to some higher truth, to something beyond the mere physical presence of the tree. As night approaches, the "sash" or movable portion of the window is lowered, perhaps to prevent the air, cooled from lack of the sun's warmth, from entering the house (Webster 1026). The narrator continues, "But let there never be curtain drawn / Between you and me." Literally, this statement could imply that he does not want a drape to cover the window betwen them. A sense of foreboding arises if one looks at additional definitions. "Curtain" can refer to death and "drawn" can refer to being brought about by inducement or being allured (Webster 280, 346). The narrator begins the second stanza mentioning a dream that is unclear. He then stops short and continues, seemingly describing the appearance of the tree. Referring to "head lifted out of the ground, / Not all your light tonuges taliking aloud / could be profound." Perhaps the speaker could be describing the vastness of the tree's height and width along with the magnitude of leaves. Comparing tongues to leaves is a possibility because, as the wind rushes through them, it causes a distinct sound. The speaker may even believe that the tre... ...In stanza four, the speaker compares "outer" and "inner" lives. "Tree at my Window" contains descriptions and comparisons that almost bring an image to one's mind. Perhaps I have been able to relate to this poem because I have often looked out of the window at the trees and mountains in the distance and contemplated some dilemma. Perhaps we could all learn from nature not to be so anxious about things that in the long run do not really even matter.       Works Cited Cox, James, M. Robert Frost: A Collection of Critical Essays. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962. DiYanni, Robert. Literature: Reading Fiction, Poetry, Drama, and the Essay. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994. Thompson, Lawrence. Robert Frost: The Early Years 1874-1915 New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. Massachusetts: G&C Merriam, 1977.

The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement by Eliyahu M. Goldratt Essay

In a situation like Alex Rogo’s, the Plant Manager for the Bearington Division of UniCo Corporation, who has been given three months by his boss to either show a profit or face shutdown, one can be tempted to consider an easy option – quit now and look for another job while your reputation is still intact. The temptations for Alex to consider this option are many – his plant has not shown any profit for quite some time, orders are often shipped months late, the inventory position is so bad that the aisles of the plant floor are crammed with in-process parts, almost all jobs are designated as â€Å"rush† and upon all this his marriage is on the precipe because he has been spending all his time in the plant. However, Alex decides to take the problems head on. In this quest, he is helped by his old Physics professor, Jonah. Rather than giving him ready made answers like a consultant, Jonah forces Alex to think by confronting him with pointed questions designed to help him bring out his intuitive skills. When Alex tells Jonah how he was able to increase productivity by thirty-six percent in one department alone with the use of robots, Jonah points it out to Alex how the robots could not possibly have contributed to the company’s goal – and that in fact in terms of its overall goal, Alex must actually be running a very unproductive plant. Prodded on by Jonah, Alex comes to the conclusion that as a first step, he first and foremost has to ensure that his plant makes money. With a continuous barrage of questions from his teacher, Alex and his team learn how to define measurements so that they better reflect the money making goal of a manufacturing organization. Proceeding systematically, they discover the facts which point to how the bottleneck machine in their plant, or in any plant for that matter, determines the throughput and that the capacity of the entire plant is actually equal to the capacity of the bottleneck. They then devise a system whereby the bottleneck (a machine called NCX-10, in this case ) is kept busy for the maximum amount of time possible – this they do by first ensuring that the NCX-10 is kept running even during lunch breaks and later on by ensuring an adequate buffer in front of the bottleneck so that it would not be idle for want of parts. In the meantime they also save time on another suspected bottleneck, the heat treatment, by relocating ... ...e omni-presence of two phenomena, dependency and variability, in manufacturing environments, it is vital that the system’s actual constraint be identified – which may or may not be physical. All other policies have to be built so that they work within the constraint. That is to say that the non-constrained resources have to be used to maximize the performance of the constrained resource. The next step is to try and improve the constraint itself, if possible. Alex Rogo is successful in turning around his plant because he unwittingly, or by design, follows this same ordered thinking process wherein he goes from first defining his fundamental measures and then exploring the effects of different parts of his plant on these measures. He is then able to identify his constraints and effect changes that allow him to maximize his plants performance within the constraint. Later when he finds that his constraint is no longer physical but has become something intangible beyond his plant, he identifies it correctly as a market constraint and tries to improve it by encouraging his sales staff to come up with new orders. And if all this wasn’t enough, Alex has also managed to save his marriage!

Perspectives on the 1939 White Paper During World War II

In 1939, the British government published a White Paper severely restricting Jewish immigration and planning for an independent Palestinian state within ten years. On the part of the British, this was an effort to secure crucial Arab cooperation in case of war. But neither the Jews nor the Arabs were pleased with the White Paper. The Jews took direct action against it, arguing that it violated earlier promises that had been made to them. The Arabs, on the other hand, argued that the restrictions were too weak.Still, the Arabs recognized the White Paper as a move in the right direction and although they went on record as opposed to it, they did not openly fight it. While the Jews forcefully rejected the White Paper, most of the Zionist leadership postponed the fight against the British in order to support them in the war. Some Jewish terrorist organizations, however, did spring up to target Britain. Throughout World War II, the White Paper allowed the British the support they had been seeking from the Arabs, while drawing opposition from the Jews.In the period leading up to the issue of the White Paper, Britain’s attempts to resolve the crisis in Palestine â€Å"occurred against a backdrop of developing tensions in Europe and the Mediterranean that ultimately had a major impact on Britain’s Palestine policy† (Smith 139). To the British, the Arab Revolt that had taken place from 1936 to 1939 â€Å"signified a rebellion that had to be crushed, not simply to preserve Britain’s own position in Palestine as the mandatory power, but to consolidate that position by appealing for Arab support both within and outside Palestine once the revolt had ended† (Smith 139).This position was adopted as the threat of war began to loom closer. German and Italian propaganda was aimed toward the Arabs, encouraging them to revolt against the British. The British knew that they could not afford to send large numbers of troops to quash a rebellion when their forces would be necessary in Europe. They also recognized the strategic importance of Palestine, and British military planners â€Å"now began to view Palestine in light of envisaged wartime needs† (Smith 139).Any troops currently in Palestine would have to be transferred to Egypt and the Suez Canal at the outbreak of war, and eventually reinforcements from India would have to travel through Palestine. Peace in Palestine was now considered â€Å"essential to British military security† (Smith 139). But more was necessary to guarantee British security in the region. In addition to control over Palestine, the British needed â€Å"assurance of the tacit, if not open, support of the neighboring Arab countries† (Smith 140).The Palestine situation was crucial to gaining this support, as Arab leaders had become increasingly involved in the conflict during the revolt. Creating a solution that was favorable to the Arabs would promise Britain the support of the Arab world during the war. In January 1939, British strategists advised that â€Å"‘immediately on the outbreak of war, the necessary measures would be taken†¦in order to bring about a complete appeasement of Arab opinion in Palestine and in neighboring countries’† (Smith 140) The British also recognized that maintaining their mandatory power in Palestine was necessary if they hoped to use it as a strategic base.But the Partition Plan had already been proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937. This â€Å"raised questions in the Foreign Office: if the Jews were recognized as having national status in part of Palestine, what further justification would there be for Britain’s staying there as mandatory authority? † (Smith 140). Nevertheless, the Cabinet approved the Partition Plan. Expecting the Zionists to do the same, they were â€Å"startled by the force of Zionist opposition to the plan† (Smith 140). As a result, the Woodhead Commission was f ormed to investigate the possibilities for partition.The Foreign Office, which strongly opposed partition, used this opportunity to have the committee â€Å"reopen the question of the practicability of partition, not just its scope† (Smith 140). Fearing a hostile Arab reaction to British policy, the Foreign Office argued that â€Å"‘the European implications of a hostile Middle East aligned with Britain’s enemies must override the arguments in favour of partition’† (Smith 140). The Woodhead commission submitted its report in November 1938, after a period of severe Arab revolt had â€Å"temporarily paralyzed much of Palestine† (Smith 141).The Commission concluded that â€Å"there were no feasible boundaries for ‘self-supporting Arab and Jewish states’† (Smith 141). Still, the commissioners recommended three different partition plans. One plan reduced the Jewish portion to approximately 400 square miles along the coast, whil e the other two made the state even smaller. The Zionists rejected all of the proposals, which paved the way for the British government to issue a White Paper on November 9, 1938, which â€Å"discarded the entire notion of partition as ‘impracticable’† (Smith 141).This abandonment of partition allowed the British to take control of all of Palestine, securing their mandatory power and their strategic bases. Although they had succeeded in maintaining control, the British still needed to resolve the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews. The White Paper therefore called for a conference in which the two group would discuss â€Å"‘future policy, including the question of immigration into Palestine’† (Smith 141). It also warned that if the two parties could not agree, the British would â€Å"‘take their own decision in the light of their examination of the problem’† (Smith 141).The St. James Conference, held in London in Febru ary 1939, swiftly reached an impasse. Jamal al-Husayni, the cousin of the mufti, â€Å"demanded the creation of an independent Arab state and the dismantling of the Jewish National Home,† while Chaim Weizmann argued for â€Å"a continuation of the mandate and British sponsorship of unlimited immigration† (Smith 141). With the threat of war looming ever closer, â€Å"Arab opinion in the Middle East now seemed more important to British interests than was Jewish opinion in Palestine or Jewish political influence in London† (Smith 143).The British government decided to act. They â€Å"finally agreed to the Arab state overtures† (Smith 142) and published the White Paper on May 17, 1939. The 1939 White Paper illustrated a â€Å"stunning reversal of policy† (Smith 139) and was â€Å"interpreted by contemporaries as marking the end of the alliance between the Jews and Great Britain† (Shapira 276). It restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine to 1 0,000 per year for five years with an additional 25,000 refugees permitted.After five years, no further Jewish immigration would be allowed â€Å"‘unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it’† (Shapira 469). Land transfers to Jews were also restricted to certain areas. The White Paper declared that â€Å"‘His Majesty’s Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population of the country’† (Smith 142). The new policy planned for Palestine to be an independent Arab state within ten ears, when Jews would make up no more than one-third of the population. Zionist reaction to the 1939 White Paper was abrupt. Declaring that the Jews would resist its implementation, the Jewish Agency argued that the plan was â€Å"contrary to international law and a violation of the promises made to the Jews in and since the Balfour Declaration† (Smith 142). On the day after its publication, the Grand Rabbi tore up a copy of the White Paper before the assembled congregation in the principal synagogue of Jerusalem.Street demonstrations in the same city resulted in the death of a British constable from a Jewish revolver shot. Mass meetings of Jews throughout the country took an oath to observe a proclamation which contained the following passages: ‘Whereas the British Government has announced a new policy in Palestine†¦Now therefore the Jewish population proclaims before the world that this treacherous policy will not be tolerated. The Jewish population will fight it to the uttermost, and will spare no sacrifice to frustrate and defeat it’ (Khalidi 473).Jews in Palestine also announced policies of civil disobedience and non-cooperation with the British, but these plans soon ceased as â€Å"Jewish leaders knew that if the Government were t o cease its active support of the National Home the latter’s entire structure would be imperiled† (Khalidi 473). In general, â€Å"the Zionist leadership abandoned the fight against Britain and dedicated itself to promoting maximum participation of the Jewish community in the war effort† (Shapira 280). The Jewish community argued over whether they should fight the White Paper or support the British in the hope that their post-war policy would change.Moderates felt that the White Paper had been issued only because the war required Arab support. Arthur Ruppin wrote in his diary in May 1939 that â€Å"‘This White Paper emanates from a certain political constellation (Arab united front, Britain’s fear of the Arabs) and will be equally short-lived’† (Shapira 290). Moderates â€Å"demanded that tension with the British be reduced; Jews should be unconditionally loyal until the end of the war, assuming that the British government would ultima tely change its policy† (Shapira 290).Even Vladimir Jabotinsky, â€Å"despite all this criticism of the mandate government and all his attempts to exert pressure on it by threatening to replace it with another power, was not prepared to give Britain a bill of divorce. Until his dying day, he supported a pro-British orientation† (Shapira 246). Immigration, though, remained a strong point of contention. Before the publication of the White Paper, Zionist leaders had decided to increase illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine. Of the 27,561 Jews who arrived in Palestine in 1939, 11,156 were unauthorized (Smith 165).With the beginning of war, these plans intensified as thousands of refugees attempted to flee Europe. David Ben-Gurion warned that while Jews would â€Å"‘help the British in their struggle as if there were no White Paper’† they would also â€Å"‘resist the White Paper as if there were no war’† (Shapira 279). This situat ion â€Å"brought Zionists and British officials into immediate conflict† (Smith 165). When the British decided to hold illegal immigrants in internment camps in Palestine, the Zionists reacted by flooding the country with immigrants in order to make the policy impossible.The British then decided that refugees who reached Palestine would be transferred to the island of Mauritius. They simultaneously struggled to stop the flow of refugees from Europe by urging countries like Turkey to deny them transit. After the outbreak of war, the impossible refugee situation â€Å"created ‘almost†¦a war within a war’† as â€Å"Jews became increasingly bitter at what they saw as British inhumanity† (Smith 165). This situation led to disaster. In November 1940, British naval patrols intercepted two ships and transferred over 1,700 refugees to the SS Patria to be deported to Mauritius.While the ship was ported in Haifa, the Jewish defense force Hagana â€Å"ar ranged for a bomb to be placed near the hull to disable the ship, thereby forcing British authorities to permit the Jews to stay. The plan miscarried, and the ship sank with over 200 casualties† (Smith 165). The Zionists were outraged. Faced with propaganda that accused them of responsibility for the deaths, the British cabinet allowed the survivors of the Patria to remain in Palestine.Another disaster occurred in February 1942 when the British convinced the Turks to forbid the SS Struma passage into the Mediterranean. The ship full of Romanian Jews was turned back and sank with only one survivor. To the Zionists, â€Å"this was proof of British perfidy† (Smith 165). While most Jewish leaders recognized that they could not declare war on Britain, Jewish terrorist groups did grow and aim their attacks at the British. The Jewish broadcasting station, Kol Israel, stated that â€Å"The paralysing of the railways all over the country through utting the lines in 242 places s erves as a warning to the Government of the White Paper† (Khalidi 606). Such activists saw the White Paper â€Å"as the result of a British assessment that the Jews had no choice but to resign themselves to an anti-Zionist policy, because they needed British protection against the Arabs† (Shapira 290). They set out to prove the British wrong. They argued that â€Å"the only way to bring about a change in British policy was by ample demonstration of Jewish power and willingness to fight and suffer losses† (Shapira 290).They also hoped to show the British government that enforcing the new restrictions â€Å"would make it necessary for them to carry out acts of suppression on a large scale, and it was doubtful whether the British government would approve† (Shapira 290). Their actions were designed to send the British â€Å"a clear message about what the absolute limits were, limits beyond which they were prepared to die and even to kill† (Shapira 290). The publication of the 1939 White Paper also led the Irgun, a Revisionist terrorist group, to shift its focus from the Arabs to the British.Irgun began attacking British administrative buildings, assaulting British police personnel, and bombing gathering places. But once the war began, Jabotinsky urged his followers in the Revisionist party â€Å"to support the British effort against the Nazis† (Smith 170). Most of the Irgun followed Jabotinsky’s orders. Those who did not were led by Abraham Stern. The Stern Gang, formed in 1940, was â€Å"willing to rob Jewish concerns, such as a Histadrut bank, with Jewish loss of life as well as assault British officials† (Smith 170).Stern simultaneously established relationships with German and Italian representatives, offering them â€Å"his service to their cause for the duration of the war† (Smith 170). Ignoring the Nazis’ anti-Semitic platform, Stern allied himself with the Germans simply because they were fighting Britain. The Hagana and the Irgun both condemned the Stern Gang, offering the British police information that led to Stern’s murder in a February 1942 raid. For the next two years, there was little Zionist underground activity.The leaders of the Stern Gang were either dead or in prison, and the Irgun had lost its leadership with Jabotinsky’s death. But Menachem Begin, who arrived in Palestine in 1942, â€Å"saw himself as the heir to Jabotinsky’s Revisionist ideals† (Smith 170). At the end of 1943, both Irgun and the Stern Gang â€Å"were again preparing for anti-British action, inspired by both the receding German threat in the Middle East and the ongoing tensions in Zionist-British relations, exacerbated particularly by the legacy of the refugee ships and the growing awareness of the Holocaust† (Smith 170).This situation led to cooperation between Begin and the remaining members of the Stern Gang. Under the name LEHI, they resumed their actions against Britain. The actions of LEHI resulted in the opposite of their intended effects. In July 1943, Winston Churchill instigated the creation of a cabinet committee on Palestine that would examine alternatives to the 1939 White Paper. The committee recommended partition, but the plan was never officially approved because on November 6, members of LEHI assassinated Lord Moyne, the deputy minister of state for Middle East Affairs in Cairo.Since Moyne had been a close friend of Churchill, the Prime Minister â€Å"reacted by shelving the partition scheme he had seen through, against stiff opposition from his ministers† (Smith 170). He announced to the House of Commons that â€Å"‘if our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins’ pistols and our labours for its future to produce only a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently in the past’† (Smith 170).Partition was not discussed again during Churchill’s term. For the duration of the war, Churchill’s warning to the Jews worked: â€Å"they stopped underground activities that seemed to threaten the likelihood of any cooperation with a British government after the war† (Smith 170). Arab views on the White Paper also varied, as â€Å"The Arab community in Palestine was essentially leaderless, riven with more factions than ever before† (Smith 144). Although they recognized this as a step in the right direction, â€Å"The Arab reaction was only partially favourable† (Khalidi 470).They were pleased with the â€Å"definite statement that there was no intention of setting up a Jewish state and the apparent determination to make Palestine an independent country in which the Jews formed not more than a third of the total population† (Khalidi 470). But they still viewed the restrictions concerning land sales as â€Å"quite inadequateâ €  because â€Å"they ignored the fact that the rights and position of the Arab population were also being prejudiced by land purchases made by Jews avowedly for ‘political and strategical reasons’ – i. . , with a view to dominating the whole country† (Khalidi 470). Arabs also had trouble believing that the British would enforce these new immigration plans. From their point of view, â€Å"similar statements at intervals during the last twenty years had never yet been followed by a cessation of the illegal immigration, and the Arab delegates saw no reason to suppose that they would be on this occasion either† (Khalidi 470).Precautionary statements in the White Paper such as â€Å"‘should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development’ and ‘provided that local conditions permit,’ taken together with ‘adequate provision for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Ho me’† suggested to the Arabs that â€Å"Jewish opposition would still be allowed to block constitutional development indefinitely† (Khalidi 471). Moderate Arabs and the leaders of the Arab governments saw the White Paper as hopeful.Those who encouraged defiance optimistically â€Å"used the example of the Arab Revolt and its presumed success in forcing Britain to deal with the Arabs, whatever its military failure† (Smith 144). The Arab Higher Committee, on the other hand, â€Å"repudiated the White Paper because it did not promise them immediate independence with a halt to Jewish immigration† (Smith 142), maintaining its â€Å"consistent refusal to admit that any part of Palestine should be given to the Zionists† (Smith 144). As a result of their rejection of the White Paper, â€Å"A certain limited recrudescence of Arab violence even manifested itself in Palestine† (Khalidi 471).The mufti, who had been officially banned from Palestine after his escape in October 1937, had a similar reaction. After the outbreak of war, British officials in Palestine sought the mufti’s support for the White Paper and his help in implementing it. They did so â€Å"out of fear of his ability to arouse general Arab hostility toward the British position in the Middle East at that time† (Smith 171). The mufti â€Å"rejected these requests and the White Paper itself† and instead â€Å"aligned himself with the Iraqi rebellion against Great Britain in April 1941, and once it failed†¦he spent the rest of the war supporting the German war effort† (Smith 171).In general, though, Arab reaction to the 1939 White Paper was not hostile. Agreeing not to engage in overt political activity, â€Å"members of the Higher Committee accepted British offers of safe return to Palestine† (Smith 172). Other leaders including â€Å"a number of leading members of the Istaqlal and the Palestine Arab party that represente d the Husaynis, along with Husayn al-Khalidi of the Reform party, reestablished themselves in the country. In general they indicated their reserved acceptance of the 1939 White Paper and istanced themselves from the mufti† (Smith 172). Although fierce Axis propaganda (including the mufti urging rebellion) was focused on Palestine in 1941 and 1942, the Arabs in Palestine remained calm. Another revolt was recognized as â€Å"out of the question, both for political and military reasons. It appeared that the British were coming closer to the Arab point of view. Although they were still quite far from meeting the Arab demands, the process was proceeding in a positive direction from the Arab perspective† (Shapira 282).In addition, the Arabs realized that any uprising would have been immediately put down by British forces stationed in Palestine. In general, â€Å"the Arab community in Palestine remained a passive element in the occurrences both during the war and afterward. T he years 1939-1947 were apparently the longest continuous period of quiet and relative tranquility in Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine since the 1920s† (Shapira 282). The reaction of Palestinian Arabs was one of â€Å"general political quiescence† (Kimmerling 134). To many, the White Paper indicated that the British intended to grant Arab independence in Palestine.Arabs saw the Zionist struggle against the policy as â€Å"a sign of anxiety and weakness† (Kimmerling 134). They were certain that â€Å"All they needed to do was bide their time† (Kimmerling 134). The British government’s strategic decision to publish the 1939 White Paper therefore proved fruitful. Although the Arabs were not entirely pleased with the decision and argued for stronger restrictions, they did offer the British their support during the war. The Jews, on the other hand, were divided in their reaction to the White Paper.Some violently fought the restrictions while others rec ognized the importance of siding with Britain. The British recognized that the consequences of Jewish terrorism were far outweighed by the support they needed from the Arab world, and throughout World War II the 1939 White Paper succeeded in that respect. Both Arabs and Jews rejected the White Paper, although to differing degrees. The Arabs argued that the restrictions were too weak, but they still offered Britain their support. The Jews struggled to fight the policy while still backing the British war effort.The British entered World War II â€Å"aware that their Palestine policy reversal in the 1939 White Paper had outraged the Zionists without satisfying the Arabs. They accepted this as the price for temporarily stabilizing their military and strategic positions in Palestine and the Arab world at large†¦It was a short-term strategy of expediency and calculated appeasement designed to serve Britain’s immediate wartime and possibly long-range imperial designs that assu med a British presence in Palestine for the foreseeable future† (Smith 145).Summary of each†¦ Info about reexamination of Husayn-McMahon Correspondence? See also Khalidi p. 468 for this. The Zionist (Biltmore) Program held in in May 1942 declared that â€Å"The Conference calls for the fulfillment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration which†¦was to afford them [Jews] the opportunity, as stated by President Wilson, to found there a Jewish Commonwealth.The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939 and denies its moral or legal validity†¦The policy of the White Paper is cruel and indefensible in its denial of sanctuary to Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution; and at a time when Palestine has become a focal point in the war front of the United Nations, and Palestine Jewry must provide all available manpower for farm and factory and camp, it is in direct conflict with the interests of the allied war effort† (Khalid i 497).They wanted Palestine to be an Arab state and they felt that the McMahon-Hussein correspondence had promised them that. They hoped to limit the number of Jews in Palestine to only those who were already there. The Jews argued that the White Paper violated promises made to them in the Balfour Declaration. Multiple standpoints existed within the Jewish community, from more moderate views to Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Party’s radical opinions.

Liberator

The views and beliefs expressed by William Lloyd Garrison in his Liberator editorial are in tune with the social and political changes that occurred in the time of the Second Great Awakening. With the rise of Baptist and Methodist churches in the United States, there was a greater trend to apply Christian doctrines to the resolution of social issues. The same effort was undertaken by Abolitionists who were inspired to move forward with their cause that contradicted both American political values and the teaching of the Christ. The Awakening saw the beginning of large-scale social campaigns underpinned by religious views. Abolitionism was one of such campaigns, paralleled by moral reform. Garrison’s article reflects this spirit of activism striving to resolve many pending social issues and serious problems. Garrison’s beliefs were undoubtedly influenced by religious views, especially taking into account the fact that his mother was from a strong religious background. It is important, however, that he was wise enough to include everybody regardless of religious affiliation in his anti-slavery campaigns. In the Liberator editorial he states: â€Å"In defending the great cause of human rights, I wish to derive the assistance of all religions and of all parties.† (Garrison, 1831). The American Revolution seems to be a powerful symbol in William Lloyd Garrison’s abolitionist beliefs. In the editorial, he invokes the American Declaration of Independence, specifically the part that states: â€Å"that all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights — among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness† (Garrison, 1831). Garrison draws on these ideals to call for â€Å"the immediate enfranchisement of our slave population† (Garrison, 1831). To him, the connection between the ideals of the Revolution and the empowerment of slaves is obvious and immediate. The claim to equality with which all people are vested is taken to be equated with slave liberation as slaves are included into the concept of ‘people’. Garrison’s bitterness about the attitudes in the North could have been inspired by his preoccupation in the time immediately preceding the editorial with propaganda in those regions. The Northerners, lacking the sight of everyday slave exploitation, probably impressed him with their passivity and negligence concerning the cause of slave liberation. The populations in the North were perhaps less concerned with slavery and the need to overcome, knowing abuses for the most part from other people’s words and media communications. Garrison’s own views underwent a serious transformation as he devoted more time and effort to the abolitionist cause. Since his appearance in Park-Street Church on July 4, 1829, where he â€Å"unreflectingly assented to the popular but pernicious doctrine of gradual  abolition†, in the time before writing the editorial, he had ability to realize the drawbacks of this doctrine (Garrison, 1831). In the article, he presents himself to the reader as an ardent follower of immediate and irrevocable slave liberation. Now confident that slavery is a great tragedy that can no longer be tolerated, he agrees that it cannot be abolished in a gradual fashion. Instead, Garrison calls for putting an end to slavery immediately. He uses a good comparison of gradual abolition to â€Å"telling a man whose house is on fire to give a moderate alarm† (Garrison, 1831). With a serious change in his view, he now identifies his previous position as â€Å"full of timidity, injustice, and absurdity† (Garrison, 1831). The reason why Garrison thought so was that a change was necessary in order to make his doctrine more in tune with the need to carry out serious changes in slaves’ dismal position. Realizing what slaves have to endure the author rejects to wait till slavery can be abolished in gradual moves. In the final part of his message, the author addresses the public’s concerns that his language may in fact be too sharp and hurting many people. To excuse himself and justify the claims, he states that â€Å"the apathy of the people is enough to make every statue leap from its pedestal, and to hasten the resurrection of the dead† (Garrison, 1831). Thus, he insists that the current situation and people’s passivity in matters concerning slavery make him use the harsh language that appears in his messages. It is the seriousness of the offences of slavery in combination with people turning a blind eye to them that drives him to extremes in his writings. In the poem with which Garrison crowns his passionate message, he also uses a few colourful metaphors to evoke passion in people and justify the severity of his words. Thus, he states that oppression has a â€Å"soul-withering glance†, depicts its â€Å"brutalizing sway† and â€Å"iron rod† (Garrison, 1831).   These metaphors expose to the reader the size and ugliness of what the author is dealing with – slavery and its numerous atrocities. Given the brutality of oppression, it is understandable why the author feels â€Å"deep abhorrence† for the phenomenon (Garrison, 1831). Speaking of arguments, the author does not present many in this paper, as it seems to be more of a continuation and comment to his previous Prospectus. The only forcible argument is the opposition to gradual abolition and the outlined change in position on the issue. In this respect, the author seems to state his views in a passionate fashion with a lot of colourful language that help me make points more convincing. However, he could further strengthen his argument by outlining the causes of such passionate attitude. For example, it would be useful to bring once again to the discussion a more detailed description of abuses by slave-owners and of what slaves will have to endure if the abolition takes a gradual and measured character. This would help to make the position even more convincing. Overall, the article undoubtedly made an impression on those familiar with Garrison’s ideas and views and believing in his integrity and leadership. Reference Garrison, W.L. (1831, January 1). Inaugural Editorial. The Liberator.